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ESSAY
HEALTH CARE MARKET REFORM: A
CORPORATE EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE
HERSCHEL V. SELLERS HPf*
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, major U.S. employers have offered
health care benefits to their employees.' Many employers provide
these benefits voluntarily; others negotiate packages with their
unions. But what started as a fringe benefit encouraged by
government tax incentives2 has become expected as an entitle-
ment tied to employment. The role of the modern American
corporation has been gradually transformed from benevolent
provider of insurance to provider of insurance as a required
component of employment compensation.
One of the primary issues of the 1992 presidential election
was health care reform,3 and President Clinton campaigned for
universal coverage to provide health care for the approximately
* J.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison. Director of Corporate Benefits,
Monsanto Company. The views herein are the author's alone, and are not
attributable to Monsanto Company.
1. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
3. A poll conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute and The
Gallup Organization, Inc., asked Americans what issue should be President
Clinton's first priority in office. Thirty-seven percent of Americans responded
that Clinton should focus on improving the economy, 24% said reducing the
federal deficit, and 15% said reforming the health care system. When asked
what should be the second priority, 25% indicated reforming the health care
system, 24% said improving the economy, and 20% said reducing the budget
deficit. Carolyn Piucci, Public Attitudes on Health Care Reform Results of
New EBRI/Gallup Survey, 14:4 Norns 6 (Employee Benefit Research Institute
ed., Apr. 1993).
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thirty-seven million uninsured Americans .4 He has succeeded in
making health care one of the preeminent issues that our society
must address over the next several years. However, President
Clinton is not alone in his intent to reform the health care
system. Multiple health care reform bills are now pending before
Congress.5 Many of these bills propose an employer mandate,
requiring all employers to pay for a comprehensive package of
health care benefits for their employees. An employer mandate
would make these benefits a cost of doing business without
regard to whether the employer or the employee believed them
to be an essential part of the employment contract.
The initial impact of an employer mandate on large employers
who already offer comprehensive health care benefits would
likely be negligible, although a few adjustments to coverage
would have to be made. On the other hand, the massive restruc-
turing of health care in the private market sector will produce
4. Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA
2491, 2491 (1991) (citing estimate of 31-36 million uninsured Americans); GAO
Says Universal Access to Health Insurance "Achievable Goal", 93 TAx NOTES
TODAY 12-70 (Jan. 19, 1993) (estimating 34 million Americans without health
insurance); Katharine R. Levit et al., Americans' Health Insurance Coverage,
1980-91, 14:1 HE.TH CARE FIN. REV. 31, 33 (1992) (estimating 34.7 million
uninsured Americans in 1991, or 14.40o of the U.S. population).
5. See, e.g., the Clinton health plan, H.R. 3600 & S. 1757, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Clinton Plan]; the Chafee/Thomas bill, H.R. 3704
& S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring employers with less than
100 employees to participate in a purchasing cooperative, mandating individuals
to have health insurance with a penalty for non-compliance, and eliminating
pre-existing condition exclusions); the Cooper/greaux bill, H.R. 3222 & S.
1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (promoting a managed competition-type
plan by encouraging the formation of health plan purchasing cooperatives to
negotiate health plans for coverage on behalf of employers with fewer than
100 employees, establishing a basic benefits package, limiting the deductibility
of health plans to the least expensive cost of the package, and encouraging
the formation of accountable health plans); the Michel/Lott bill, H.R. 3080
& S. 1533, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (implementing small group insurance
reforms, expanding the Medicare program, and providing individuals with tax
incentives to save for medical expenses through "medical IRAs"); the Mc-
Dermott/Wellstone bill, H.R. 1200 & S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(establishing a single-payer, Canadian-style government system of health care,
replacing Medicare, Medicaid, and most private health insurance with a
government-run system administered at the state level, and establishing a
national health board to set a national health budget based on annual health
costs); the Stark bill, H.R. 200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing
annual budgets based on prior year national health expenditures, rates for all
personal health services, national standards for health insurance plans, a new
federal program to provide health insurance to all children under age 19, and
expanded benefits under Medicare and Medicaid); the Nickels/Stearns bill,
H.R. 3698 & S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing medical
savings accounts).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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an unknown impact on health care cost. And while government
participation in the system has its proper applications, many of
the proposed interventions are improper. Adoption of any pro-
posal that requires significant restructuring coupled with exten-
sive governmental regulation will create severe market distortions
affecting both business and health care environments indefi-
nitely.
It is generally agreed that the health care delivery system in
the United States has become somewhat bloated and inefficient.
While U.S. consumers have access to the highest quality care in
the world, it is also the most expensive. Many parties are to
blame. First, federal tax policy promotes generous tax-free med-
ical benefits for employees, the cost of which is tax-deductible
to employers. 6 Second, insurance companies generally act as a
conduit for funds rather than being concerned with efficiency
and quality; when corporate employers self-insure but use in-
surance companies as claims-processing intermediaries, the in-
surance company has little interest in managing health care
costs. 7 Third, employers have paid for tax-favored coverage
without attempting to apply good business principles to reducing
insurance costs with the same vigor applied to other cost centers.
Fourth, health care providers, and particularly individual phy-
sicians, have not focused on health care value. Quality of care
has been important to health care providers, but not cost. Under
typical fee-for-service arrangements, physicians can determine
what services to provide and how much to charge, and thus
greatly influence both demand and supply of services. These
market distortions lead to higher medical costs. Finally, consum-
ers assume that the medical system can cure anything that goes
wrong, and fail to recognize their own basic responsibility for
their health.
While they have approached a solution to the problems with
varying degrees of fervor, each of these five parties recognize
that the American health care system must change. Alliances,
insurance purchasing cooperatives, and networks are forming to
provide leverage to obtain the best value. Insurance companies
are forming capitated network arrangements 8 that promote cost
6. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
7. The incentives for insurance companies to reduce health care costs
deteriorate further if the corporate employer pays the insurance company for
claims-processing services based on dollar volume of claims processed. Under
this common arrangement, it is in the insurance company's best interest for
health care costs to escalate.
8. Under capitated network arrangements, insurers pay providers a flat
dollar reimbursement per covered employee, regardless of whether services are
rendered. This provides an incentive for the provider to better manage health
care costs.
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saving through managed care. Health care providers are discov-
ering ways to achieve higher quality in partnership with active
purchasers. The health care "balloon" is being squeezed from
all sides and will have to contract due to heightened competition.
Other countries have reformed their health care systems, 9 but
the United States has the chance to be uniquely creative and
successful through the use of currently available and pending
technology. A great deal of positive reform will be accomplished
because of the information that is available through computer-
generated data collected by doctors, hospitals, and employers.
With better data, doctors will know which hospitals provide the
best value and how to adjust their practice to achieve the proper
balance between quality and cost. The entire delivery system
will begin to take greater advantage of communications through
data technology. For example, "best practice" parameters will
become increasingly available and aberrations in practice will be
subject to peer review on a current time basis.
The result of these advances is that the market will be better
able to reward high value medical practice and penalize practices
that produce low value. With more information available, pur-
chaser and provider groups will independently continue to es-
tablish optimum methods for efficiently selling and buying health
care. As the system becomes more integrated, opportunities to
carve out pieces of the market will erode. The market may need
assistance from government in this process, but the market can
and should be allowed to solve the problems. The role of
government should be to encourage the market-driven process
that already exists.
This Essay considers the response of corporate employers 0 to
issues involving the provision of health care benefits to employ-
ees, retirees, and dependents in the context of impending reform.
Part I discusses the business of health care. Part II describes
current practices in corporate employer health care coverage.
Part III analyzes three of the health care proposals and their
potential impact on business. Part IV discusses the proper role
for government in health care reform. The Essay concludes that
the basic thrust of health care reform should bring the principles
of open economic competition to all levels of the system. The
same economic process that makes the United States the most
9. See generally Leo van der Reis, Health Care Reform: In Perspective,
In Reality, infra this volume, at part II.
10. As used in this Essay, "corporate" employers refers to those companies
with more than 100 employees. Many of the proposed reforms, including the
Clinton Plan, have special provisions for companies with less than 75 em-
ployees. The potential impact on these smaller employers is outside the scope
of this Essay.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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powerful economy in the world should be employed to make
our health care system the world's most efficient and effective.
I. TIE BusINEss OF HEALTH CARE
Americans may not appreciate the fact that medical care is
delivered in a highly competitive economic market place. One-
seventh of our economy is related to health care." Like other
businesses, most doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies
are in business to make a living and earn a profit. All of these
entities are in the system to provide a product or service and
they expect a financial return. Many do it with a sense of social
consciousness. Nevertheless, they are all part of the business of
health care, and it is naive to believe that health care is provided
by only benevolent care givers.
Like any business, the health care industry must be able to
react nimbly to a rapidly changing market place. Technology is
progressing at an explosive pace. Data collection and usage is
becoming an integral part of all aspects of health care manage-
ment, and even doctors are finding themselves being pulled into
the computer age. Purchaser coalitions and provider alliances
are being formed to take advantage of technological advances
and to position themselves properly in the market.
The turbulent health care system is responding everywhere to
the need for expanded efficiency. It can and will respond and
change. This is because the purchasers of health care are begin-
ning to require a better, higher-value product; one that fulfills
new needs as they arise. The competitive process is not neat
and tidy; some experiments fail. But the new tactics being used
by individual businesses, alliances of providers, and coalitions
of purchasers are often responsive and innovative. Many bright
minds are seeking solutions and will find them.
The government's self-perceived activist role in reform can
jeopardize the market's ability to respond to new and better
technology, ideas, and designs, and to correct itself when mis-
takes are made. Business hopes that government will recognize
its legitimate role to provide resources for universal coverage,
education, and medical research, and to reduce abuse. Govern-
ment may see its role differently, and attempt to re-engineer the
entire health care system. Should this happen, the flexibility and
innovation of the private sector will be replaced by a system
11. In 1991, national health expenditures represented 13.2% of GDP.
Suzanne W. Letsch et al., National Health Expenditures, 1991, 14:2 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 1, 1 (1993). Expenditures are expected to rise to 18.2% of
GDP by 2000. Sally T. Burner et al., National Health Expenditures Projections
Through 2030, 14:1 HEALTH CAPE FIN. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
1994]
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characterized by static programs, massive bureaucracy, and a
hampered ability to respond to change.
II. CoRp'oRATE EMPLOYER HEALTH CARE COVERAGE
A. Extent of Coverage
Most corporate employers offer extensive health care benefits
to their employees. Part of the reason is historical. During
World War II, Congress passed tax incentives to encourage
employers to provide health care benefits.'2 Also, employers
circumvented wage freezes by attracting employees through the
provision of health care benefits." Since World War II, health
care benefits have expanded due to market pressure; employers
compete for labor by offering generous benefits, and medical
care benefits constitute an important factor in employment
decisions. Employers also use benefit programs to retain valued
employees and promote loyalty.
Most corporate employers with more than 100 employees
provide their employees with some form of health insurance
coverage. 14 Typical health care benefits include surgical, doctor
visits, and hospital room and board coverage.s Health plans
may also include coverage for mental and nervous disorders,
drug rehabilitation, and pharmaceutical products. 6
Corporate employers are increasingly offering preventative
care and wellness programs. 7 These programs are intended to
reduce the demand for health care through education and early
intervention. At their best, preventive programs enable employ-
12. See generally Paul Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The Changing
Objectives of National Health Insurance, 1915-1980, in COMPULSORY HEALTH
INSURANCE 115 (Ronald L. Numbers ed., 1982) (providing historical back-
ground of health care reform).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
WAR LABOR BOARD: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND WAGE STABILIZATION IN WAR-
TIME 308-09 & n.3 (1942-45).
14. In a 1993 annual survey of over 1000 major U.S. employers, 100%
offered some type of preretirement medical plans. HEWrTT ASSOCIATES, SAL-
ARIED EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PROVIDED BY MAJOR U.S. EMPLOYERS IN 1993, at
30 (1993) [hereinafter HEWITT SURVEY]. Approximately 82% of the employers
offered some type of postretirement medical plan. Id. at 52.
15. Id. at 34-35.
16. Id. at 40-41.
17. For example, 26% of nondurable goods manufacturers that were
surveyed provided "well baby" coverage in 1992. WYATT COMPANY, COMPAR-
ISON: 1993 STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT-GRouP BENEFITS 34 (1993). In the 1993
Hewitt Survey, 76076 of employers reported some type of initiative to encourage
healthy lifestyles. Approximately 74% reported using health risk assessments
and screening processes. HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 14, at 51.https://opens holarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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ees to lead healthier and better lives and cost employers less in
health care benefits. Such programs often include smoking ces-
sation, blood pressure and cholesterol screening, weight loss,
and mammographies. These programs, without any prompting
by the government, have led to improved health status while
reducing health care expenses. 8
B. Tax Treatment
Congress provides generous tax incentives that allow medical
benefits to be given tax-free to employees19 while being fully
18. Janet L. Bly et al., Impact of Worksite Health Promotion on Health
Care Costs and Utilization, 256 JAMA 3235 (1986).
19. Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or the Code)
provides:
(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION. - There shall be allowed as a
deduction the expenses paid during the taxable year, not compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the
taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section 152),
to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted
gross income.
(b) LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDICINE AND DRUGS - An
amount paid during the taxable year for medicine or a drug shall
be taken into account under subsection (a) only if such medicine
or drug is a prescribed drug or insulin.
I.R.C. § 213. Section 105 of the Code provides in relevant part:
(a) AMOUNTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts received by
an employee through accident or health insurance for personal
injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the extent
such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the employer
which were not includable in the gross income of the employee,
or (2) are paid by the employer.
(b) AMOUNTS EXPENDED FOR MEDICAL CARE. - Except in the
case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for
any prior taxable year, gross income does not include amounts
referred to in subsection (a) if such amounts are paid, directly or
indirectly, to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for expenses
incurred by him for the medical care (as defined in section 213(d))
of the taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents (as defined in
section 152). Any child to whom section 152(e) applies shall be
treated as a dependent of both parents for purposes of this
subsection.
(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO ABSENCE FROM WORK. - Gross
income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) to
the extent such amounts-
(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of
use of a member or function of the body, or the permanent
disfigurement, of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as
defined in section 152), and
(2) are computed with reference tO- the nature of the injury
19941
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deductible to employers as a business expense. 20 Consequently,
employers have tended to push as much compensation into this
framework as possible. The tax-favored status of health care
benefits contribute to their increasing cost. Employers agreed to
provide compensation to their employees through the tax-favored
medium of health care, and, until recently, failed to monitor
closely the value received. Employees came to expect this tax-
free benefit from their employers, which, if they bought coverage
outside a plan, would be paid with after-tax dollars. 21 In the
absence of significant employee co-payments or deductibles that
require employees to carefully consider the potential value of
the services to be rendered, the federal tax policy promotes the
over-consumption of health care services and keeps employees
from appreciating the true cost of medical care. 22
without regard to the period the employee is absent from work.
(d) [Repealed]
(e) ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS. - For purposes of this
section and section 104-
(1) amounts received under an accident or health plan for
employees, and
(2) amounts received from a sickness and disability fund
for employees maintained under the law of a State or the District
of Columbia, shall be treated as amounts received through accident
or health insurance.
(f) RULES FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION 213. - For purposes
of section 213(a) (relating to medical, dental, etc., expenses) amounts
excluded from gross income under subsection (c) or (d) shall not
be considered as compensation (by insurance or otherwise) for
expenses paid for medical care....
I.R.C. § 105. Section 106 of the Code provides, in its entirety, that "[giross
income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under
an accident or health plan." See also I.R.C. § 125(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1
(1993) (addressing cafeteria plans).
20. I.R.C. § 162(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a)
(1993).
21. I.R.C. § 213(a). Thus, premium payments and medical expenses paid
directly by the individual would be paid with after-tax dollars and would only
be deductible to the extent they exceed 7.5%V0 of gross income.
22. One way to limit consumption is to require the employee to make co-
payments and to increase deductibles. Most employer plans limit reimburse-
ments to 80% of reasonable and customary charges. For indemnity plans,
67% of employers place an 80% limit on hospital coverage, and 71% of
employers place an 80% limit on surgical coverage. HEwrrr SURVEY, supra
note 14, at 34-35. Annual deductibles are required by 16% of HMO plans,
74% of PPO plans, and 9707 of indemnity plans. Id. at 38.
According to a Rand study, employees who have to pay for part of their
coverage use fewer services, and using fewer services does not significantly
impact health status. See generally WILLIAM G. MANNING ET AL., HEALTH
INSURANCE AND THE DEMAN FOR MEDICAL CARE: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOM-
IZED EXPERIMENT (1988).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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C. Cost Reduction and Quality Enhancement Efforts
As employee health care benefits expand, so do the costs to
the employer. Medical care can easily account for more than
ten percent of an employer's payroll when it includes expendi-
tures for retirees.
In recent years, major employers have been successfully pur-
suing ways to control their health plan costs. Employers use
bargaining leverage through networks established by insurance
companies or health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to ne-
gotiate discounted fee arrangements. Providers are willing to
give discounts to large employers or networks in order to boost
volume and market share.
The bargaining efforts of employers profoundly affect prov-
iders such as hospitals and doctors. If a discount is given to an
employer, the provider will attempt to make up the correspond-
ing revenue loss by (1) shifting the cost to other purchasers in
the system, (2) lowering costs through increased productivity,
and/or (3) increasing the number of services provided.
Discounts given to businesses have rarely been offset by a
provider's ability to improve efficiency. Instead, health care
providers shift the cost elsewhere, and only the most egregiously
inefficient parts of the system are fixed. Those paying higher
premiums are typically smaller businesses with weaker bargaining
power.
How far can cost-shifting go? Large employers are not the
only ones that cause cost-shifting. The federal government cre-
ates cost-shifting though Medicare2 and Medicaid 24 by limiting
reimbursements for services provided to the elderly and low-
income individuals, forcing providers to charge higher prices to
paying consumers and insurers. Small employers also form coop-
eratives, which lead to additional discounts and more cost-
shifting. As more and more purchasers seek volume discounts
from providers, there may be no one left to whom the providers
can shift and, as a result, the cost-cutting honeymoon that large
employers have enjoyed through volume discounts may be com-
ing to an end.
To reduce costs in the future and derive savings other than
through cost-shifting, the delivery system must become more
efficient. High-value care provided in a timely manner will be
23. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, 79
Stat. 286, 290 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
24. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79
Stat 286, 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
19941
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expected and required. Along with the changes needed to achieve
high value, some form of direct health care rationing will begin
to emerge, especially in the case of terminally ill patients.
Perhaps the optimal system would be controlled by primary
care doctors who are well paid, responsible for basic patient
decisions, and given proper financial incentives to make referral
decisions to specialists and hospitals based on value, as deter-
mined by factors of cost and quality. If the system makes
hospitals and specialists responsible to primary care doctors
based on the doctors' perception of cost and quality, the system
will be operated by medical people making medical decisions
that incorporate value to the patient. Ultimately, hospitals and
specialists will be more attentive to how they spend health care
resources, or else suffer a competitive disadvantage. Such a
system will keep the decisions about care in the medical com-
munity and reduce the intervention of non-medical administra-
tors.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. The Clinton Plan
The Clinton Plan would impose a joint individual/employer
mandate. Individuals would be required to purchase health care
coverage either through a regional or a corporate alliance. 25
Employers with more than seventy-five full-time employees would
pay eighty percent of the health care premium cost for their
employees, 26 and employees would be required to pay the re-
maining twenty percent. 27
Under the Clinton Plan, employers with more than 5000
employees, however, may elect to become corporate alliances. 28
As the sponsor of a corporate alliance, the employer must offer
its employees a menu of at least three approved health plans.29
25. Clinton Plan, supra note 5, § 1002. Medicare-eligible individuals are
excluded from the mandate. Id.
26. Id. § 6121 (for regional alliance employers) and § 6131 (for corporate
alliance employers).
27. Id. §§ 6101-6103.
28. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A) & (e)(3).
29. Id. § 1382. The Clinton Plan would require all insurance plans to
provide coverage in accordance with the Comprehensive Benefit Package
(CBP). Id. § 1101. Proposed § 1101 provides that the "comprehensive benefit
package" shall include hospital services, services of health professionals,
emergency and ambulatory medical and surgical services, clinical preventive
services, mental health and substance abuse services, family planning and
pregnancy services, hospice care, home health care, extended care, ambulance
services, outpatient laboratory, radiology, diagnostic services, prescription
drugs, outpatient rehabilitation services, durable medical equipment and pros-
thetic and orthotic devices, vision and dental care, health education classes,
and investigational treatments. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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Corporate alliances would negotiate for health care services with
the accountable health plans where their employees are located.
Employers would have to negotiate for each location, and their
employees would not be allowed to purchase coverage through
regional alliances. Additionally, corporate alliances would be
obliged to offer standard benefits and would have to fulfill
burdensome administrative responsibilities.30
Except for corporate alliances, premium costs to participate
in an accountable health plan would be subject to community
rating. Under community rating, the accountable health plan
would be required to charge uniform premiums for each indi-
vidual in a particular community. The only basis for varying
premiums would be family status. Corporate alliances, however,
will be able to include their own experience as part of their
premium determinations.
Employers would continue to deduct all health-related benefit
costs. After ten years, costs above the standard benefit package
would be taxed to employees. 3' A one percent payroll tax would
be applied to corporations that form corporate alliances. 32
B. Other Proposals
Under the Cooper/Breaux Plan,3 3 there would be no employer
mandate. However, small employers would be required to enroll
in Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs) and to use
HPPCs to contract with health plans. 34 Large employers would
be required to offer accountable health plans.35 Individuals not
otherwise eligible for coverage would be permitted to enroll in
an HPPC.3 6
The Cooper/Breaux Plan does not specify a standard benefits
package, but provides that a package would be determined by
the Health Care Standards Commission, 37 which would oversee
the health care market.
The employer deduction for health care cost would be capped
at the price of the lowest-priced accountable health plan in the
local HPPC. 8 Individual premium payments would be deduct-
30. Id. §§ 1386-1388.
31. Id. § 7201(a).
32. Id. § 7121.
33. H.R. 3222 & S. 1579, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Cooper/
Breaux Plan].
34. Id. § 1005(a).
35. Id. § 1005(b).
36. Id. § 1104.
37. Id. § 1201(1), § 1302(a).
38. Cooper/Breaux Plan, supra note 33, § 1001.
1994]
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ible up to the cost of the lowest-priced accountable health plan.39
Employer premium payments would still be fully excludable by
employees. 40 Like the Clinton Plan's regional alliances, the Coo-
per/Breaux Plan would require each state to charter at least one
HPPC.41 Only one HPPC would operate in each geographic
area.42
The McDermott/Wellstone Plan43 proposes a Canadian-style
single-payer system. There would be no employer mandate or
purchasing alliances because everyone would be covered" through
a program operated entirely by the government. An American
Health Security Standards Board would be responsible for pol-
icies and procedures for the program .4- Like the Clinton Plan,
an extensive list of benefits are included. 46 Employers could,
however, provide additional benefits to their employees. 47 Ben-
efits would still be deductible to the employer and excludible
from the employee's gross income.
C. The Corporate Response
Employers need to control their own destiny; how they handle
benefits given to employees is no exception. Benefits are an
important component in developing a positive employer/em-
ployee relationship. Legislation that would remove the employer
from the equation, other than as a conduit for cost, would
impair this mutually beneficial nexus.
A tenet of health care design is that one size does not fit all
and if something fits today, it probably will not fit tomorrow.
It is essential that plan designs be allowed to change freely as
the health system evolves. Static plan design is an impediment
to improved efficiency. Further, plan design should be allowed
to change at the local level where the health care is actually
provided. The idea of having a plan design imposed nationally
or even statewide chills innovation and efficiency and should be
avoided.
39. Id. § 1003(a).
40. Id. § 1001(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 4980C(e)).
41. Id. § 1101(b).
42. Id.
43. H.R. 1200 & S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Mc-
Dermott/Wellstone Plan].
44. Id. § 102.
45. Id. § 401.
46. The benefits would include inpatient and outpatient hospital care,
professional services of authorized health care practitioners, community based
primary care services, long-term care, home health care, prescription drugs,
dental services, mental health and substance abuse treatment. No cost sharing
for acute care would be allowed. Id. § 201.
47. Id. § 201(f).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
CORPORATE EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE
Both the Clinton Plan and the McDermott/Wellstone Plan
would effectively remove the employer from its position as a
health care system participant and employee advocate. The
availability of "corporate alliances" in the Clinton Plan would
appear to give large employers the ability to retain their status
as plan sponsors. However, the burdensome requirements placed
on corporate alliances make them untenable. The Administration
has found to its dismay that few, if any, employers of 5000 or
more employees would elect to form their own alliances. This
is because the corporate alliances must generally perform all of
the functions of a regional alliance, including the communication
and administrative work.48 Also, multi-state employers would
not be able to obtain care for employees at outlying locations
through existing regional alliances. Rather, the corporate alli-
ances would have to contract directly with providers in the
outlying locations as well as fulfill all of the local administrative
requirements at that location.
In addition, because the Clinton Plan assumes that employers
would only form a corporate alliance if their costs were lower
than those of the regional alliance, the Clinton Plan imposes a
one percent surtax on an employer's payroll. Finally, with the
rich, mandated benefits9 that are established and required by
the Clinton Plan, there is little opportunity to vary design to
suit perceived employee needs.
For all of these reasons, corporate alliances under the Clinton
Plan are a concession without substance for large employers.
The Cooper/Breaux Plan allows for much greater employer
involvement because the alliances are not required for employers
with 100 or more employees. However, even under the Cooper/
Breaux Plan, the requirement to offer plans of a specific benefit
level would reduce employers' ability to produce benefits most
suited to their individual needs.
In early 1994, several important U.S. business groups, includ-
ing the Business Roundtable, 0 the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce,5' and the National Association of Manufacturers5 2 voiced
their opposition to the Clinton Plan. While each of these groups
expressed recognition that substantive health care reform is
needed, they generally asserted that the Clinton Plan represented
48. Clinton Plan, supra note 5, §§ 1386-1388.
49. See supra note 29.
50. Adam Clymer, Powerful Business Group Backs Rival to President's
Health Plan, N.Y. Tmnus, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al.
51. Robert Pear, Business Groups and Labor Unions Attack Clinton on
Health Plan, N.Y. TIMuS, Feb. 4, 1994, at A19.
52. Louis Uchitelle, Manufacturers Oppose Clinton Plan, N.Y. TImEs, Feb.
6, 1994, at A26.
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excessive government intervention into the health care system.
These business groups are clearly reluctant to turn one-seventh
of our economy into a highly regulated system run by an
extensive new federal and state bureaucracy. Not surprisingly,
these groups advocate market-based reform with governmental
involvement that extends to implementing a structure for the
uninsured and preventing systemic abuse.
Some corporate employers with extensive retiree medical lia-
bilities generally favor portions of the health care reforms that
will eliminate their obligation to provide retiree medical benefits.
This position comes from their interest in leveling the playing
field. Not all corporate employers, and very few small employ-
ers, provide retiree medical benefits.53 Individuals retiring before
age sixty-five ("early retirees") that have no postretirement
coverage and who are not yet eligible for Medicare do not
benefit from an employer mandate - they fall through the
cracks. If the government does not provide benefits, or require
all employers to provide postretirement coverage, the goals of
universal coverage are thwarted. Without this change, corporate
employers would be penalized for providing health care benefits
to their retirees when retirees of smaller employers would obtain
guaranteed coverage through a government program.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: TAE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Government has an important role in the health care reform
process. Business has long recognized that government should
help stimulate a competitive, innovative economic environment
by establishing a necessary degree of regulation. In short, gov-
ernment has three roles to fulfill, and none of them are incon-
sistent with basic business objectives. First, government needs
to assure that there are enough resources in the system to provide
health care coverage to all citizens. Allowing a large segment of
society to exist outside the health care system weighs heavily on
all concerned, business and individuals alike. Second, govern-
ment needs to allocate sufficient resources to ensure that medical
research and education continue to be a critical part of the
health care system. Third, government needs to assure that
abuses that can occur within any economic system are kept tct
a minimum.
These are difficult roles to fill. The primary questions that
the government must confront are: How will we pay for the
uninsured? How can we guarantee universal coverage and how
53. See supra note 14. Even fewer small employers offer postretiyement
medical benefits.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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will it be provided? How can abuses in the system be limited
without imposing so many regulations that the required flexi-
bility is reduced and the opportunity to innovate and evolve
quickly is diminished?
Business leaders generally believe that striking the proper
balance in the complex health care delivery system will require
incremental change, because no one can say with certainty
whether a profound fundamental restructuring will work. The
process requires health care purchasers to reasonably adapt to
the changing needs of health care providers and vice versa. And
in the midst of this turmoil, patients must retain their status as
the most important constituent in the system.
As the rough and tumble competition proceeds with its rapid
changes and shakeouts, government can provide mechanisms to
avoid abuse. These include appropriate antitrust rules tailored
to the health care delivery system, and malpractice and medical
products liability reform to reduce the unnecessary defensive
medicine that is currently practiced. With these governmental
actions, the system can become leaner over the next several
years. The trick is to find the right balance that includes the
proper amount of government participation in the system.
At the other end of the spectrum are those areas in which
government should not intrude. These include areas affecting
innovation, premium and expenditure caps, financing, and com-
munity rating.
A. Areas in which Government Intervention is Appropriate
1. Antitrust Regulation of Health Care
The antitrust laws and regulations that have evolved over the
years should be generally applicable to the health care system.
However, it will be necessary to reformulate the laws to allow
local entities to strike a proper balance between competition and
protective regulation. Many reform bills provide exceptions for
certain segments of health care delivery from antitrust laws.
In September 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission issued six policy guidelines regarding
mergers and other regulated activities. 54 The policies define the
circumstances under which the Agencies will not challenge cer-
tain conduct as a matter of procedural discretion. The six areas
include: (1) hospital mergers; (2) hospital joint ventures involving
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE CoMM'N, STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA (1993).
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high-technology or other expensive medical equipment; (3) phy-
sicians' provision of information to purchasers of health care
services; (4) hospital participation in exchanges of price and cost
information; (5) joint purchasing arrangements among health
care providers; and (6) physician network joint ventures. The
Agencies recognized that "additional anti-trust guidance may be
desirable in the areas covered by these policy statements as well
as in other evolving health care contexts." 55
As the law and regulations evolve to provide appropriate
antitrust protections, it is essential that there are not different
rules for competing providers. For example, HMOs, integrated
service networks (ISNs), and hospital alliances should be subject
to the same rules because they typically compete for the same
customers in the same marketplace. On the other hand, where
there is a single source provider such as a rural hospital, the
rules will have to accommodate reasonable consolidation. This
may be intrinsically anti-competitive, but is necessary due to
local circumstances.
2. Medical Malpractice Tort Reform
Medical malpractice litigation is an insidious contributor to
the cost of health care in the United States. As jury awards and
legal fees increase, so do premiums; doctors and hospitals in
turn charge consumers or their insurers more for services.
Excessively large jury awards in malpractice cases are only
part of the problem. The larger source of cost escalation is the
result of additional and unneeded testing and services ordered
by physicians and hospitals practicing defensive medicine in
order to insulate themselves against accusations of failure to
provide sufficient or correct care. A battery of shotgun tests,
which may only marginally improve a diagnosis, often provides
little more than a shield to insulate physicians from liability.
Physicians are not necessarily to blame for a system that
forces them to use these tactics to protect themselves. This is a
flaw in the health care and judicial systems that must be fixed.
Under the Clinton Plan, all medical malpractice claims for
services rendered by a regional or corporate alliance must be
submitted to an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism,
including arbitration or mediation, prior to commencing litiga-
tion.56 Each alliance must establish an ADR mechanism.57 If the
claim is not resolved through ADR, the plaintiff must submit
an affidavit that they have consulted a "qualified medical spe-
55. Id. at 3.
56. Clinton Plan, supra note 5, § 5302(a).
57. Id. § 5302(b).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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cialist" who has determined that the action is reasonable and
meritorious. 8 Contingency fees are limited to one-third of the
recovery amount. 5 9
Perhaps a better means of providing malpractice insulation
would be physician and hospital adherence to "best practice"
parameters established by peer groups coupled with reasonable
dollar limits on malpractice recovery. Patients and the com-
munity must be protected from malpractice but there also must
be a reasonable balance struck between this protection and its
cost to society from unneeded services and unrestrained court
awards.
B. Areas in which Government Intervention is Inappropriate
1. Innovation
Innovation is messy. It creates inequities between those who
initially foster and benefit from the innovation and those who
do not. It also imposes costs on those who are the subject of
innovation that does not succeed.
Governmental regulations that seem to apply to today's mar-
ket and reflect good-hearted intent can easily become antiquated
obstacles to innovation in tomorrow's market. The current set
of health providers and researchers, as well as consumer prac-
tices, primarily affect the financing and distribution of health
care, not the quantity and quality of health care goods and
services provided. The long-term effect of health care reform
will be determined largely by whether new, cost-effective prod-
ucts and practices are encouraged or discouraged. The current
market's concern for cost reduction, higher productivity, and
value is highly innovative, flexible, and dynamic. Government
should not necessarily interfere in this process.
A governmental process set up to define the opportunity for
innovation in health care reform would likely be composed of
people who are uncomfortable with innovation. The bureauc-
racies of tomorrow must be able to respond quickly to change.
Unfortunately, government is not as concerned about producing
innovative solutions. It is more often concerned about retaining
and expanding the current system, which will quickly lag behind
leading methods. When health care becomes institutionalized
and politicized, it will be slow to respond. When policy for
tomorrow is determined and set today, it will become a barrier
to innovation.
58. Id. § 5303.
59. Id. § 5304.
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2. Premium and Expenditure Caps
Premium caps and expenditure caps have never worked over
the long-run, and the health care system should not be designed
with these as its underpinning. Over time, caps will tend to
focus provider attention on an artificial compression of resources
rather than on the market to determine the amount of needed
resources by providers actively competing to obtain revenue.
In a government-defined system with an artificially suppressed
spending limit, innovation will suffer. New drugs and medical
equipment will be developed at a slower pace. Innovation is
driven by the development of ideas and the ability of individuals
to put those ideas to work, often against vested interests. Ex-
penditure caps tend to remove the incentive to commit sufficient
resources to the process of developing new and better alterna-
tives.
The system has plenty of resources to provide the best care.
Perhaps the most effective way of reallocating resources is
through incentives available to the providers. Doctors should
make the medical care decisions based on value that have a cost
component attached.
3. Financing
Rechanneling the excess resources in the system to pay for
coverage of the uninsured will require time. An alternative source
of funds would be a tax on the health care providers in an
amount sufficient to pay for indigent care. This would help
eliminate cost-shifting because every provider would be respon-
sible for paying part of the cost of indigent care even if they
had little direct responsibility. A provider tax focuses the ex-
penses of indigent care on the segment of the market that can
increase the efficiency of the process. A broad-based tax such
as an individual income tax sounds equitable, but providers
would view it merely as a source of revenue.
4. Community Rating
"Community rating" has been used to describe an array of
pricing mechanisms. Insurers typically price insurance coverage
based on "experience rating," which assesses an individual on
a wide array of health-related variables to determine the risk
that the individual faces. In contrast, community rating assesses
the average risk faced by all the individuals within the com-
munity.
Community rating in essence compresses the range of variation
in individual premiums produced by experience rating. Three
forms of rate compression have been proposed: strict (or pure)https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
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community rating, 60 adjusted community rating (or community
rating by class),6' and rating bands.62 The result under any of
these is that the spread between the high and the low ends of
risk is greatly reduced while the average cost of insurance is not
affected.
There are competing fairness criteria in the debate. The in-
surance industry asserts that it is only fair to rate according to
individual risk. This may confuse actuarial fairness with moral
fairness. Isn't society under a moral imperative to care for its
underprivileged regardless of financial circumstances or genetic
heritage? Only pure community rating, which provides a single
rate for each person, spreads the risk of bad health evenly
throughout society.
The essence of insurance is to spread risk across a class of
people so that the protection can be affordable. By setting up
classes of risk pools to group people of like risk into one pool,
people of like risk can pay an amount closer to the inherent
value of their coverage. Adjusting for risk allows the individual
to pay more precisely what the value of the coverage is to the
individual.
The pure community rating concept is comprised of two
components: the value to the individual and the value to society.
In a pure community rating situation, society will pay if the
value to an individual is greater than average due to risk factors;
the individual will pay if the risk is less. Pure community rating
thus results in a transfer of wealth, or implicit tax. The head
tax falls most heavily on the younger, less financially secure
segment of the population. It is intrinsically regressive.
An additional criticism leveled at pure community rating is
that if insurers do not rate according to individual risk, insurers
will not be taking into consideration free-riding by those whose
voluntary lifestyle behavior imposes costs on the insurance pool
- behavior such as smoking, overeating, not wearing seat belts,
not exercising, hang gliding, and engaging in unprotected sex.
Indeed, community rating may result in higher health costs
60. Strict community rating allows premiums to vary only according to
geographic location, level and type of benefits, and family status. See MARK
A. HALL, Is CoMMuNmTY RATING ESSENTIAL TO MANAGED COMPETITION? 2
(1994).
61. Adjusted community rating allows additional variation according to
defined demographic classes, such as age and gender. Id.
62. Rating bands are the least demanding means of accomplishing rate
compression. Rating bands allow an additional measure of rate variation
beyond age- and gender-adjusted community rating, reflecting to some extent
individual health risk associated with prior claims experience or with occu-
pational industry classifications. Id.
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because individuals will have no financial incentive to improve
their health and reduce costs if premiums are determined by the
actions of the community at large, actions over which the
individual has no control.
Should community rating be modified or pure? The system
will likely move toward pure because it is administratively sim-
ple. On the other hand, community rating, which helps those
groups that are at a disadvantage in searching for affordable
health care, will provide employers with a disincentive to con-
sider the demand side of the financial equation. Employers will
no longer be able to save money by promoting healthy lifestyles
among their employees. Without the financial incentives that
are taken away by community rating, employers will cease to
be concerned with promoting health, because employers will
have to pay the same price as every other employer. Only when
there is some financial return available will business take the
initiative to improve health status.
Government intervention is necessary to provide community
rating to employees and citizens who are not able to compete
in the marketplace for reasonable health care rates because they
are not members of a sufficiently large group. Government
regulation must help define the balance between the rights of
employees and citizen groups to strive for and achieve healthy
outcomes versus those employees and citizens who are not in
such groups and must rely on community rating.
CONCLUSION
To use the balloon analogy, business and government are
both squeezing the balloon, reducing their health care cost while
the same cost pops out in another sector. But we have not
generally been directly attacking the way that health care is
practiced. We have not let much of the air out of the balloon.
When we can provide stimulus and incentive to have doctors
and hospitals recognize that their product, like every other, must
be based on quality and cost, then we will have a market that
strives for efficiency. And it is clear that the marketplace is the
crucible for developing high-quality health care at low cost. This
part of the equation will not come from government regulators.
It is not their job. However, purchasers will demand that
providers in the marketplace keep costs under control and quality
high, and providers will respond. Providers will do it because
it is in their best social and economic interest.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/6
